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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 15, 1984

Dear Julian:

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I have examined both the concept paper on "The Future of Soviet Science", and the description of the fields to be covered in the Soviet Science NIE that you have given me for examination and comment; and believe they address both areas appropriately. There are, however, a few points that I would like to stress which will be of great interest to the policy level consumer.

Specifically, I think that defining and understanding the Soviet science base as it now exists and as we see it developing over the next decade is important. But it is also important that we devote sufficient effort to making an adequate appraisal of the Soviet process of adapting science to technology; and understanding the full technological, political, and military relevance of the Soviet science base.

The impact of Soviet science and technology policy on national security is a problem I struggle with on a daily basis. The governmental system produces a directed economy with limited emphasis on the commercial sector and great emphasis on the defense sector. The lack of consumer goods and the abundance of military systems demonstrates this emphasis. Assuming that the Soviets desire, as they clearly demonstrate, to obtain defense leverage from the application of science to defense technology, I would suggest that you specifically consider the following questions in your research and subsequent reporting:

- How do the Soviets develop national goals for science and technology policy (i.e., what is the decision process)?
- What are these goals?
- How do they implement these goals?
- What is the institutional structure which allocates resources to science and technology?

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- What are their investment strategies?
- What means are used to ensure that basic science is transitioned into technological leverage?
- How does the science community, both research and academic, interrelate with the bureaucracy of government and the industrial sector?

This top level downward approach to Soviet science and technology policy is the analog to the vision I have of a more focused effort for the allocation of research within our own government.

Finally if we look backward from the military operational requirements arena through the industrial base and on into the technology arena and science base, can we identify some of the motivations and drivers that guide the Soviet's investment strategy in scientific research.

I look forward to the results of your efforts as an important input to the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and the United States policy making community, and hope you find my comments useful.

Sincerely,

G. A. Kevworth

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